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District Court No. CV-2013-84 
(Gooding County) 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Appellant, Robert Johnson, offers this Brief in Support of his Petition for Review 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 118. Review is requested because the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that "claim preclusion" barred the claims raised in the successive post-conviction 
relief petition at issue is at odds with the plain language of J.C. § 19-4908. Additionally, as set 
out in the Opening and Reply Briefs, the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Johnson's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 1 Accordingly, this Court should accept review, 
reverse the judgment dismissing Mr. Johnson's post-conviction relief petition and remand for 
further proceedings. 
1 Mr. Johnson's Opening and Reply Briefs as well as the entire record before the Court 
of Appeals are fully incorporated herein by this ref erencc. 
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FIL D-COPY 
I. GENERAL COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A. Initial Post-Conviction Proceedings 
In 1994, Mr. Johnson's counsel told him that they could not prove his innocence with the 
evidence available at that time and that he would be executed within five years unless he pleaded 
guilty to first degree felony murder. CR 26-27, 52-55. Confined in solitary at the jail, Mr. 
Johnson did not have access to any information to the contrary and was forced to rely on what he 
later would learn was faulty information in deciding to enter his guilty pleas. See id. Mr. 
Johnson's co-defendant Thomas Peterson, who bore sole responsibility for the murders, pied 
guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. CR 49-51, 217. 
The district court sentenced Mr. Johnson to a determinate life term. CR 217. 
On about March 10, 2009, Mr. Peterson handed Mr. Johnson a notarized confession 
taking sole responsibility for the murders and acknowledging that Mr. Johnson had acted under 
threat of bodily injury or death. CR 39-41. Mr. Peterson also revealed the existence of a 
recording of his initial disclosure of the truth to law enforcement twenty-two years prior, which 
law enforcement suppressed and the prosecutor withheld in violation of the principles outlined in 
Brady v. Maryland. Id. Mr. Johnson did not know that a successive post-conviction application 
was the appropriate remedy to bring the new information before the Court but immediately took 
steps to discover what he should do by contacting the paralegal and his aunt. CR 56-62, 275-78. 
Finally, after about two months of research and attempting to speak with legal counsel, an 
attorney finally accepted Mr. Johnson's call and informed his that he could file a successive 
application for post-conviction relief. CR 56-57, 277. Mr. Johnson thereafter submitted the 
appropriate request to obtain the paperwork packet from the paralegal, waited for the paperwork 
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to arrive through prison mail system, filled out that paperwork and then submitted the appropriate 
papcrvvork to make an appointment to makes copies of the packet, get the documents notarized 
and mail them out. CR 278. This process took weeks of waiting. Mr. Johnson filed the instant 
successive petition approximately four months after receiving his co-defendant's confessions and 
the information about the withheld recording of Mr. Peterson's confession. CR. 24 
In the proceedings on Mr. Johnson's 2009 successive post-conviction relief action, his 
attorney affirmatively represented that he would take certain actions to support Mr. Johnson's 
claims, including filing an amended petition. CR 17-18, 29, 98-100. Mr. Johnson's attorney did 
not amend the 2009 petition and did not explain the actions Mr. Johnson took between receiving 
Mr. Peterson's revelations and filing the 2009 petition. See CR 226. Once Mr. Johnson realized 
that his attorney was not going to support his claims, he attempted to remedy the situation by 
filing a number of prose motions, including motions to remove his attorney and to provide 
additional time. CR 14, 226. 
The district court did not rule on Mr. Johnson's motions regarding his attorney and 
instead ruled on the state's motion for summary dismissal. CR 226; see also Response to Notice 
oflntent to Dismiss, filed March 29, 2013 (Augmented into Record 9-14-2014). In so ruling, the 
district court erroneously applied the standard applicable in death penalty cases to determine that 
Mr. Johnson was required to initiate the successive action within 42 days within discovery of his 
co-defendant's revelations or demonstrate "extraordinary" reasons for filing after forty-two days. 
CR 178-79, 296. See Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,727,202 P.3d 642,649 (2008) (a 
reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after 
the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows 
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that there were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim 
within that time period). The district court found that Mr. Johnson "should have known" that a 
successive post-conviction relief petition was the correct forum to address the new information 
and that Mr. Johnson did not provide any evidence showing that he took any steps to prepare or 
file a post-conviction packet between March 11 and May, 2009. CR 292-93. The district court 
found that Mr. Johnson failed to establish that four months after receiving his co-defendant's 
revelations was a reasonable time to file the successive petition. Mr. Johnson appealed and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed solely on the basis that the district court correctly concluded that Mr. 
Johnson had not established that he filed his successive petition within a reasonable time. CR 
217-221. 
B. Proceedings on 2013 Petition 
On February 14, 2013, Mr. Johnson filed the instant successive petition for post-
conviction relief and provided additional evidence regarding the circumstances he encountered 
after receiving the information and confession from Mr. Peterson. CR 5-163. After initially 
refusing to appoint counsel, the district court appointed counsel for the limited purpose of 
addressing the timeliness of the first successive application and whether further consideration of 
that issue was foreclosed by the doctrines of res judicata or "law of the case." Order Re 
Appointment of Counsel (Augmented into Record on 9-14-2014). 
Relying on established precedent, Mr. Johnson alleged that his attorney's ineffective 
assistance in the 2009 proceedings was a sufficient reason to justify that failure to adequately 
support the timeliness of his petition. CR 247-48. The district court found that ifpost-
conviction counsel failed to provide facts and admissible evidence establishing that Mr. Johnson 
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filed the successive petition within a reasonable time, that failure would constitute "sufficient 
reason" justifying a successive petition. CR 289. The district court nonetheless summarily 
dismissed the petition, finding that the additional information regarding the challenges Mr. 
Johnson encountered in preparing the 2009 petition did not establish that four months was a 
reasonable time. CR 283-297. Mr. Johnson appealed. 
While Mr. Johnson's appeal was pending, this Court issued its decision in Murphy v. 
State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), which overruled the precedent on which Mr. Johnson 
had relied to establish a sufficient reason to re-litigate claims that were inadequately presented 
due to counsel's ineffective assistance. However, Mr. Johnson noted that in addition to the 
ineffective assistance of his post-conviction attorney, the timeliness of his 2009 petition was 
inadequately presented as a result of his attorney's affirmative misrepresentations and the district 
court's refusal to acknowledge Mr. Johnson's prose motions to remove his attorney prior to the 
2009 action being summarily dismissed. Mr. Johnson argued that the affirmative 
misrepresentations by counsel and his own efforts to remedy the situation give rise to sufficient 
reason to raise claims previously adjudicated in his prior petition, including the timeliness of the 
2009 petition. The Court of Appeals concluded that I.C. § 19-4908 does not provide a basis for 
Mr. Johnson to reassert claims already adjudicated in his first successive petition. Johnson v. 
State, Docket No. 41414 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015). Mr. Johnson petitioned for review. 
II. REASONS REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED 
This Court should accept review because the Court of Appeals determined an issue not 
previously considered by this Court and in contradiction to I.C. § l 9-4908's plain language. 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, Mr. Johnson's personal efforts to remedy the effect of 
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his attorney·s affirmative misrepresentations establishes a sufficient reason vvhy the timeless of 
the 2009 successive petition was inadequately presented and to allow Mr. Johnson to re-litigate 
that issue in the instant proceedings. Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth in Mr. 
Johnson's arguments to the Court of Appeals, this Court should accept review, reverse the 
summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
A. The Court of Appeals' Decision Ignores I.C. § 19-4908's Plain Language 
This Court exercises free review over questions of law. State v. 0 'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990). Statutory construction is a question oflaw. State v. Hickman, 
146 Idaho 178, 184, 191 P.3d 1098, 1104 (2008); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689, 85 P.3d 
656, 665 (2004 ). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; 
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 
265 P.3d 502, 506(2011 ). 
The statute at issue here provides that: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or 
not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant 
has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not 
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application. 
LC. § 19-4908. A court considering whether there is sufficient reason for filing the claim in a 
successive petition must consider whether the claim was asserted within a reasonable time. 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). 
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Here, Mr. Johnson's 2009 successive petition was filed four months after he received the 
factual basis for that petition - Mr. Peterson's confession and the information he provided 
regarding the withheld evidence. Despite counsel's promises to conduct discovery and support 
Mr. Johnson's claims, counsel did not support the 2009 petition with facts showing that it was 
filed within a reasonable time. In addition to counsel's misrepresentations, Mr. Johnson alleged: 
District Court error in not having a hearing on filed motions by the Petitioner that 
were at the heart of the issues before the Court [pertaining] to the Summary 
Dismissal that the Court was deciding on. Petitioner was trying to correct errors 
by his counsel before the Court made a ruling. 
CR 7. The Register of Actions for the 2009 action, of which the district court took judicial 
notice, reflects that on December 23, 2009, Mr. Johnson filed the following: Motion to 
Withdraw Counsel, Motion to Appoint Substitution Counsel, Motion to Continue, Motion to 
Proceed without filing briefs, Motion for Order for Telephonic Hearing, Motion to Conduct 
Discovery, Affidavit in Support of Motions. Equity demands that such personal attempts to 
correct counsel's actions before the action is dismissed and which are ignored by the district 
court be deemed sufficient to present the claims in a successive action. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that claim preclusion bars Mr. Johnson from asserting 
"different theories" in support of the claims already adjudicated - e.g. the timeliness of his 2009 
petition. Johnson, No. 41414 at 5. The Court of Appeals further held that the sufficient reason 
exemption in I.C. § 19-4908 is not inconsistent with res judicata and, instead, "exists for those 
cases in which an issue was unascertainable or unavailable at the time of the original 
post-conviction." Id. at p. 6. The Court concluded that claim preclusion bars re-litigation of the 
claims in the second successive petition and the l.C. § 19-4908 exemption does not apply 
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The Court of Appeals' conclusion cannot be reconciled with I.C. § 19-4908.s plain 
language allowing a claim to be raised in a subsequent proceeding if it was inadequately raised in 
prior post-conviction relief proceedings. If a claim was "unascertainable" or "unavailable," it 
could not be "inadequately raised" in an initial post-conviction relief proceeding and instead, 
would not be raised at all. Concluding that I.C. § 19-4908 applies only allow unknown claims 
i.e. those that were not previously presented - renders the phrase inadequately raised a nullity. 
Further, Mr. Johnson is not attempting to re-litigate previously raised claims by 
supporting them with new theories. Rather, the instant petition asked the district court to 
consider additional factual support for Mr. Johnson's claims, including timeliness. Mr. Johnson 
would have presented this information in the 2009 proceedings if the district court had not 
refused to acknowledge his requests to discharge his attorney and if the attorney had not 
misrepresented the steps he would take to support Mr. Johnson's petition. Thus, the district 
court's refusal to consider his prose motions and his attorney's affirmative misrepresentations 
provide a sufficient reason justifying the failure to present this additional factual support in the 
2009 proceedings. 
The Court of Appeals rendered the phrase "inadequately raised" in I.C. § 19-4908 a 
nullity by concluding that the statute only applied to unascertainable or unknowable claims. 
Rather, I.C. § l 9-4908's plain language provides that a claim is not barred in a successive 
proceeding if the petitioner can establish a sufficient reason explaining why it was inadequately 
raised in the prior proceeding. This Court should therefore accept review and reverse the district 
court. 
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B. This Court Should Accept Review, Reverse and Remand Because the District Court 
Erred in Concluding That Mr. Johnson Had Not Produced Sufficient Evidence to 
Establish an Issue of Fact as to Whether His Successive Petition Was Filed Within a 
Reasonable Time and Counsel Was Not Permitted to Address Mr. Johnson's Other 
Claims 
Here, Mr. Johnson was not initially aware that a successive post-conviction application 
was the appropriate remedy to bring the new information before the Court but immediately took 
steps to discover what he should do by contacting the paralegal and his aunt. Finally, about two 
months later, an attorney informed Mr. Johnson that he could file a successive application for 
post-conviction relief. Mr. Johnson thereafter submitted the appropriate request to obtain the 
paperwork packet from the paralegal, wait for that paperwork to arrive from the prison mail 
system, filled out that paperwork and then submitted the appropriate paperwork to make an 
appointment to makes copies of the packet, get the documents notarized and mail them out. This 
process took weeks of waiting. Mr. Johnson was given the incorrect address and sent the petition 
to the prosecuting attorney for filing. See CR 28. Thus, the 2009 petition was delayed another 
two weeks while Mr. Johnson mailed the petition to the correct address. Cf CR 21 with 24. Mr. 
Johnson filed the instant successive petition approximately four months after Mr. Peterson 
provided his confession and told Mr. Johnson about the withheld evidence. 
Here, the district court incorrectly applied the standard applicable in death penalty cases 
as set forth in Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,727,202 P.3d 642,649 (2008) to determine that 
Mr. Johnson was required to initiate the successive action within 42 days within discovery of his 
co-defendant's revelations or demonstrate "extraordinary" reasons for filing after forty-two days. 
CR I 78-79, 296. See Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) (a 
reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after 
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the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows 
that there were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim 
within that time period). 
However, the effect of the expedited procedures mandated in death penalty case is 
ameliorated by the automatic appointment of counsel to assist the petitioner with his post-
conviction remedies. See ICR 44.2 the district judge who sentenced the defendant [to death] shall 
appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any 
post-conviction remedy referred to in LC. Section 19-2719(4) that the defendant may choose to 
seek") ( emphasis added). Unlike the death penalty applicant, petitioners seeking relief under 
Title 49 must prepare and file the initial and any successive petitions without the assistance of 
legal counsel. 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion Mr. Johnson should have known the time limit 
for initiating a successive post-conviction relief action, Mr. Johnson could not have known he 
was required to do so within 42 days. Instead, in providing for a year to file an initial post-
conviction relief, during which time the petitioner is presumed to know the basis for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the legislature acknowledged that a pro se prisoner is unlikely to be able to 
immediately prepare and file a cause of action. Had Mr. Johnson known how to research the 
issue, it is far more likely he would have sought guidance from LC. § 19-4902 and thought that a 
year was a reasonable time to initiate the successive action. By holding Mr. Johnson to a 
standard he could not have anticipated, the district court deprived him of any meaningful 
opportunity to present his claims in deprivation of the procedural due process guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Nor does Reyes v. State, 128 Idaho 413,913 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1996). cited by the 
district court. signify that Mr. Johnson's ignorance of a successive post-conviction petition as the 
correct procedural mechanism is irrelevant to the determination of the "reasonable" time frame. 
CR 293. In Reyes, the defendant did not file within the statutory statute of limitations and her 
ignorance as to that statutory period did not provide the basis for a discovery exception to the 
statute of limitations. Reyes, 128 Idaho at 415,913 P.2d at 1185. Thus, Reyes simply stands for 
the well established proposition that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Here, there is no 
statutory time frame or other legal guidance illustrating the period to initiate a successive post-
conviction proceeding and Mr. Johnson could not have foreseen application of the death penalty 
standard. 
In response, the state claims that the additional facts Mr. Johnson presented explaining 
his efforts in filing the instant petition cannot be considered because the petition's untimeliness is 
res judicata. Respondent's Brief p. 12. However, as argued in Mr. Johnson's Opening Brief, res 
judicata and the law preclude further consideration of the same issue. See also CR 297, citing 
Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791,797,291 P.3d 474,480 (Ct. App. 2012) and Stuart v. State, 136 
Idaho 490,495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001). A reasonable time is determined "on a case-by-case 
basis." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The question now 
before the Court is whether the additional information, which Mr. Johnson was prevented from 
presenting due to the district court's failure to acknowledge his prose motions to excuse his 
counsel, establishes that Mr. Johnson filed within a reasonable time. This issue was not 
addressed in the prior proceedings and its consideration is not precluded by res Judi cat a or the 
law of the case. 
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The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Johnson did not present an issue of fact as 
to whether he filed his successive petition within a reasonable time. Because counsel was 
appointed to assist Mr. Johnson solely on the issue of timeliness and that is the only issue 
addressed by the district court, this case must be remanded to allow for appointment of counsel 
and to present further evidence in support of Mr. Johnson's substantive claims. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in his briefing to the Court of Appeals, Mr. 
Johnson respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his post-
conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this c2Siay of June, 2015 
, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
yn Fyffe 
Attorneys for Robert Johnson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this;2~ day of June, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be served on the following individuals by the method indicated below: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
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